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Abstract
Password security is a crucial component of modern internet security. In this
paper, we present a provably secure method for password verification using
combinatorial group theory. This method relies on the group randomizer system, a subset of the MAGNUS computer algebra system and corrects most of
the present problems with challenge response systems, the most common
types of password verification. Theoretical security of the considered method
depends on several results in asymptotic group theory. We mention further
that this method has applications for many other password situations including container security.
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1. Introduction
This material essentially appeared in [1], but we feel it is an important
application that should be more widely publicized and is a perfect entry for the
present special volume on Cryptography and Internet security.
Secure password identification is a crucial component of modern internet
security. Password verification is essential and this requires a backup system.
Backup password security is handled most often by a challenge response system
(see [2]) accompanying the password. In the simplest systems, this takes the
form of secondary password questions such as the prover’s mother’s maiden
name or place of birth. There are many inherent difficulties with these types of
challenge response systems such as the trivial problem of the provers
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.92011
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remembering their responses. More critical is the problem that this type of
information for many people is readily available and easily found or guessed by
would-be attackers or eavesdroppers. Challenge response systems are also
subject to middleman attacks and replay attacks. There have been many attempts
to alleviate these problems, including zero-knowledge password proofs and
challenged responses somewhat based on RSA as well as timed out responses
(see CRAM-MD5, Password Authenticated Key Agreement, [2] [3]).
This article presents an alternative method for challenge response password
verification using combinatorial group theory. Further, this method is provably
secure. It depends upon the theoretical and practical difficulty of solving the
search membership problem within a given finitely presented group without
knowing the presentation and the difficulty of solving systems of equations
within free groups. This latter problem has been proved to be NP-hard. This
alternative method uses the group randomizer system; a computer program that
is a subset of MAGNUS, a much larger computer algebra system, designed to
handle algorithmic problems in combinatorial group theory. MAGNUS was
developed at CAISS, the Center for Algorithms and Interactive Scientific
Software, a research laboratory housed at City College of the City University of
New York and under the direction of the first author. The group randomizer
system can be placed on a simple hand held computer device presently under
development at CAISS. The system can also be used from computer to
computer.
The group theoretic techniques have several major advantages over other
challenge response systems. Using standard authentication terminology, the
password presenter will be denoted the prover while the presentee is the verifier.
The methods we present can be used for two-way authentication, that is the
same method authenticates both the prover to the verifier and the verifier to the
prover.
From the standpoint of cryptology, the method is a symmetric key
authentication protocol. In its application, each prover has a standard password
that is a common shared secret with the verifier. In addition, each prover is
assigned a finitely presented group G. This group is called the challenge group.
The total common shared secret between prover and verifier consists of

( P, G )

where P is a standard password and G is the challenge group. The challenge
group will provide an unlimited set of back-up challenges to the password. These
challenges are in the form of group theoretical questions concerning G. The
assignment of the challenge group to a given prover will be done randomly by
the group randomizer system which we will explain. Cryptographically, we
assume the adversary can steal the encrypted form of the group theoretic
responses. From a security viewpoint, this does not present a problem. Each set
of back-up challenges forms a virtual one time code as we will explain in the
paper. Therefore, the adversary must steal three things—the original password,
the challenge group and the group randomizer. Hence there is almost total
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.92011
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security in this challenge response system. Further, there is an infinite supply of
finitely presented groups to use as challenge groups and an infinite supply of
challenge response questions that never have to be duplicated. These will be
explained in the paper. Finally in distinction to other backup password protocols
the group theoretic method is a two-way protocol between the prover and the
verifier; while the verifier authenticates the prover’s password, simultaneously
the prover authenticates that he or she is dealing with the true verifier.
A major advantage of this technique it that it is provably secure. The proof of
its security depends upon asymptotic group theory which we explain in Section
6. A result of Lysenok [4] implies that stealing the challenge group is NP-hard
while a result of Jitsukawa [5] says that the asymptotic density of using
homomorphisms (see Section 6) to attack the group randomizer protocol is zero.
In the next section, we provide a brief primer on combinatorial group theory
and then a description of the group randomizer system. We then present several
variations on how the group randomizer system can be used for secure password
verification protocols. After this with we give the security model showing that it
is provably secure.
Finally we describe how the group randomizer system and password methods
can be used as a secure lock for container security.
This group randomizer system password security approach is part of a large
program to use computational combinatorial group theory as a tool in secure
data storage and data identification.
Sadly the first author, who inspired much of this work, passed away
during the preparation of the paper. We thank him posthumously for his
many ideas.

2. Finitely Presented Groups and Combinatorial Group Theory
Combinatorial group theory attempts to study groups via group presentations. A
group presentation can be thought of as an encoded method to describe a given
group.
A group presentation for a group G consists of a set of generators X for G and
a set R of defining relators on the generators X. In this case we write G = X ; R .
For purposes of this paper and the challenge response password authentication
protocols we propose, we may assume that G is a finitely presented group. By
this we mean that both the set of generators X and the set of defining relators are
finite. The books by Baumslag [6], Lyndon and Schupp [7], Magnus, Karrass and
Solitar [8] Camps, GrRebel and Rosenberger [9] are standard references for this
material. Another reference for the use of combinatoiral group theory in
cryptography is the book by Baumslag, Fine, Kreuzer and Rosenberger [10].

X = { x1 , , xn } and the formal inverses
{x ,, x } . Then the set X = { x1 ,, xn } is a set of generators for a group G
if every element g ∈ G has an expression as a word in the generators and their
inverses. The identity is considered the empty word. We do not assume that this
Consider a finite alphabet,
−1
1
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expression is unique. A relator on X is a word W ( x1 , , xn ) which represents
the identity in G. A relator of the form xi xi−1 or xi−1 xi is called a trivial relator.
A set R = { R1 , , Rk } of words on X is a complete set of defining relators if
every relator W can be transformed into the empty word by finitely many
insertions and deletions of elements of R and trivial relators. Two words W1 , W2
on the generators represent the same group element G if and only if W1 can be
transformed into W2 by insertions and deletions of relators in R and trivial
relators. If X is a set of generators for G and R is a set of defining relators we say

G has the presentation G = X ; R . A finite presentation will always define a
group (see [8]) for which this is the presentation. A set of words W1 , , Wm ,
in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of G is said to determine a set
of normal forms for G.
Presentations are in no way unique, however in principle all group theoretic
questions about G should be answerable given a presentation. For a group
presentation, the word problem asks whether given any word on X, is there an
algorithm to determine in finitely many steps whether this word represents the
identity in G. In general the word problem is undecidable. That is there exist
group presentations for which it can be proved that no such algorithm exists (see
[6]). A particularly nice class of groups, which have both normal forms and
solvable word problems, are the automatic groups (see [11]).
For a group G and a subgroup H of G the membership problem (also called
the generalized word problem) is the problem of determining algorithmically
whether a given word W, written in terms of the generators of G, lies in the
subgroup H. As with the word problem, the membership problem is in general
undecidable. Clearly a solution to the membership problem, in a given group,
implies a solution to the word problem.
Fundamental to combinatorial group theory is the concept of a free group. Let

A be a set. Then, a group F is free on A if every mapping f : A → G , where G is
a group, can be extended to a unique homomorphism of F to G. We denote this
by F [ A] . A group is free if it is free on some set A. It can be proved that given a
set A, there exists a free group on A and further if two sets A1 and A2 have the
same size then the corresponding free groups F [ A1 ] and F [ A2 ] are
isomorphic. If A = { x1 , , xn } is a finite set, we say that F [ A] is a free group
of rank n and sometimes denote this by Fn .
From the viewpoint of group presentations free groups are groups with a
presentation with an empty set of defining relators. If F is free on

X = { x1 , , xn } then there are no nontrivial relators on X and a presentation for
F is F = x1 , , xn . In this case the elements of F can be considered as reduced
±1
words on the alphabet { x1 , , xn } . The identity element is considered as the
empty word. Reduced means that we can cancel any occurrences of xi xi−1 or
xi−1 xi . It is clear that each word has a unique reduced form and hence the word
problem for F is solvable.
A well-known theorem due to Nielsen and Schreier (see [6]) says that a proper
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.92011
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subgroup of a free group is again a free group, of course on a different set of
generators. For our purposes what is important is that a finitely generated
subgroup of a free group is completely determined by a finite set of words which
have only trivial cancellation between them.
Essential to the group randomizer system protocols is that algorithmically
both the word problem and the membership problems are solvable in free

groups. That is given a free group F = F ( x1 , , xn ) of finite rank n we can
decide algorithmically whether or not a word W = W ( x1 , , xn ) represents the

identity; given two words W1 = W1 ( x1 , , xn ) , W2 = W2 ( x1 , , xn ) we can
decide algorithmically whether W1 = W2 in F; given a finitely generated
subgroup H of F and a word W, we can decide algorithmically whether the
element defined by W lies in H. Details on these algorithmic procedures can be
found in [6] [8] [9].

3. The Group Randomizer System
The group randomizer system is a computer program that can handle several
elementary tasks involving finitely presented groups. It is a subset of MAGNUS,
a large computer algebra system, developed at CAISS—the Center for
Algorithms and Interactive Scientific Software. The program MAGNUS is
specifically designed to handle computations and algorithmic problems in
combinatorial group theory. At present there are various versions of the group
randomizer, including a portable hand held version now under development.
The scope of a particular group randomizer system will depend on the type of
login protocol or cryptographic protocol desired. At the most basic level the
group randomizer system has the ability to do do the following things:
1) Recognize a finite presentation of a finitely presented group with a solvable
word problem and manipulate arbitrary words in the alphabet of generators
according to the rewriting rules of the presentation. In particular if the group is
automatic the group randomizer can rewrite an arbitrary word in the generators
in terms of its group normal form.
2) Given a finite presentation of a group G, with a solvable word problem,
recognize whether two free group words have the same value in the given group
when considered in terms of the given generators of the group.
3) Randomly generate free group words on an alphabet of any finite size.
4) Recognize and store sets of free group words W1 , , Wk on an alphabet
x1 , , xn and rewrite words W (W1 , , Wk ) as the corresponding word in
x1 , , xn .
5) Given a free group of finite rank on x1 , , xn and a set of words
W1 , , Wk on x1 , , xn solve the membership problem in F relative to

H = W1 , , Wk , the subgroup of F generated by W1 , , Wk .
6) Given a stored finitely presented group or a stored set of free group words,
the randomizer can accept a random free group word and rewrite it as a normal
form in the finitely presented group in the former case or as a word in the
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.92011

158

Journal of Information Security

G. Baumslag et al.

ambient free group in the latter case.
7) Evaluate a group word on a set of n × n rational matrices.
In the next section we show how this can be used for secure password
verification in both directions—verifier to prover and prover to verifier.

4. Secure Password Verification
We now present several variations on secure password verification using the
group randomizer. First we give an overall outline of the protocol.
1) General Outline of the Authentication Protocol
At a theoretical level, this protocol is a symmetric key cryptographic
authentication protocol. Both the prover and verifier use a single private key to
both encrypt and decrypt within the authentication process. At first, the prover
and verifier must communicate directly, either face-to-face or by a public key
method, to set the private shared secret. This is the model now used for most
password/password back-up schemes. We assume that both the user and verifier
have a group randomizer system. For security analysis, we assume that an
adversary or eavesdropper has access to the encrypted form of the transmission
but is passive in that the adversary will not change any transmissions.
Step (1): The prover and verifier communicate directly to set up a common
shared secret

( P, G )

where P is a standard password and G is a challenge

group. Each prover’s challenge group is unique to that prover. The challenge
group is a finitely presented group with a solvable word problem and satisfying
the strong generic free group property (see Section 5). The password is chosen
by the prover while the challenge group is randomly chosen by the group
randomizer system.
Step (2): The prover presents the password to the verifier. The group
randomizer of the verifier presents a group theoretic “question” (see parts (2)
and (3)) concerning the challenge group G to the prover. The assumption is that
this “question” is difficult in the sense that it is infeasible to answer it if the
group G is unknown. The question is then answered by the group randomizer.
This is repeated a finite number of times. If the answers are correct the prover
(and the password) is verified.
Step (3): The protocol is then repeated from the viewpoint of the prover,
authenticating the verifier to the prover.
2) Free Subgroup Method
The first method we present uses a free group as the basic group theoretic
object.
We assume that both the prover and the verifier has a group randomizer. Each
prover has a standard password. Suppose that F is a free group on

{ x1 , , xn } .

The prover’s password is linked to a finitely generated subgroup of a free group
given as words in the generators—that is the prover’s password is linked to

W1 , , Wk where each Wi is a word in x1 , , xn . The group G = W1 , , Wk
is called the challenge group. In general, k ≠ n . The prover doesn’t need to
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.92011
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know the generators. The randomizer can randomly choose words from this
subgroup and then freely reduce them. The verifier has the challenge group or
subgroup also stored in its randomizer.
The prover submits his or her standard password to the verifier. This activates
the verifier’s randomizer to the prover’s set of words. The verifier now submits a

random free group word on y1 , , yk to the prover’s randomizer say W ( y1 , , yk ) .
The prover’s randomizer treats this as W (W1 , , Wk ) and then reduces it in

terms of the free group generators x1 , , xn and rewrites it as W  ( x1 , , xn ) .
The verifier checks that this is correct—that is W (W1 , , Wk ) = W  ( x1 , , xn )
on the free group on x1 , , xn . If it is the verifier continues and does this three
times (or some other finite number of times). There is one proviso. A challenge
word or submitted word can never be reused. The prover’s randomizer will
recognize if a presented challenge word has been submitted previously and reject

it. This is a further authentication to the prover of the verifier and directly
hinders middle man attacks.
To verify that the verifier is legitimate the process is repeated from the
prover’s randomizer to the verifier.
An attacker only has access to the transmitted words. Given a series of free
group words, reconstructing the subgroup involves solving systems of equations
in free groups. Solving such systems has been shown to be NP-hard (see Section
6). To prevent an attacker using an already used word to gain access the group
randomizer system allows a free group word, submitted as a challenge word, to
be used only once. If an attacker gets access to the verifier and submits an
already submitted word or vice versa from the prover this will red flag the
attempt. We also suggest that if there is a previously used word, indicating
perhaps an attack, the group randomizer should change the prover’s group. The
beauty of this system is that this can be done extremely easily—change several of
the words for example. Essentially this presents an essential one-time keypad
each time the prover presents the password. Hence there is very strong security
in this back-up system. The map yi → Wi is a homomorphism and an attacker
can manipulate various equations in an attempt to solve. Presumably if there are
enough equations the words W1 , , Wk can be discovered. However in section 6
we will present a security proof based on several results in asymptotic group
theory showing that this can not happen with asymptotic density one.
We suggest a noise/diffusion enhancement. The prover’s challenge group
generator words W1 , , Wk are indexed. With each use the randomizer applies
a random permutation φ on {1, , k } to scramble the indices. These
permutations are coded and stored both in the prover’s randomizer and the
verifier’s. These coded permutations are set at the time of initialization of the
protocol and become part of the common shared secret. This prevents a length
based attack by an eavesdropper since discovering for example what W37 is, is
of no use since it will be indexed differently for the next use. The coded
permutation is sent as part of the challenge.
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.92011
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3) General Finitely Presented Group Method
Rather than working with an ambient free group we can work with a given
finitely presented group with a solvable membership problem. Let G = X ; R
be the group. As before we assume that the group G has a solvable word problem
and satisfies the strong generic free group property. Further, as before, we
assume that both the prover and the verifier has a group randomizer. Each

prover has a standard password. Suppose that X = { x1 , , xn } and F is a free
group on

{ x1 , , xn } .

The prover’s password is linked to a finitely generated

subgroup of G, again given as words in the generators X. That is the prover’s
password is linked to W1 , , Wk where each Wi is a word in x1 , , xn . As
before, k ≠ n . The randomizer can randomly choose words from this subgroup
and then reduce them via the finite presentation. The verifier has the group or
subgroup also stored in its randomizer.
The remainder of the procedure is exactly the same as in the free group case.
The prover submits his or her standard password to the verifier. This activates
the verifier’s randomizer to the prover’s set of words. The verifier now submits a
random free group word on

y1 , , yk

to the prover’s randomizer say

W ( y1 , , yk ) . The prover’s randomizer treats this as W (W1 , , Wk ) and

rewrites it as W  ( x1 , , xn ) . The verifier checks that this is correct, that is
W (W1 , , Wk ) = W  ( x1 , , xn ) with equality this time in the group G. If it is

true then the verifier continues and does this three (or some other finite number)
of times. There is one proviso. The verifier submits a word to the prover only
once so that a submitted word can never be reused. The prover’s randomizer will
recognize if it has ( this is a verification to the prover of the verifier).
To authenticate that the verifier is legitimate the process is repeated from the
prover’s randomizer to the verifier.
As in the free group method, an attacker has access only to the transmitted
words. Given a series of group words it is infeasible to reconstruct the group.
Further, as in the free group method, a given challenge response word is to be
used only once. Since we assume that the group has the strong generic free
group property, it follows that previous challenge words cannot be used to
discover the challenge group or subgroup of the challenge group.

5. The Strong Generic Free Group Property
Part of the theoretical security of the group randomizer protocols depends upon
the strong generic free group property and asymptotic density. Asymptotic
density is a general method to compute densities and/or probabilities on infinite
discrete sets where each individual outcome is tacitly assumed to be equally
likely. The origin of asymptotic density lie in the attempt to compute
probabilities on the whole set of integers where each integer is considered
equally likely. The method can also be used where some probability distribution
is assumed on the elements. It has been effectively applied to determining
densities within infinite discrete finitely generated groups where random
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.92011
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elements are considered as being generated from random walks on the Cayley
graph of the group. The paper by Borovik, Myasnikov and Shpilrain [12]
provides a good general description of this method in group theory. Let  be a
group property and let G be a finitely generated group. We want to determine
the measure of the set of elements which satisfy  . For each positive integer n
let Bn denote the n-ball in G. Let Bn denote the actual size of Bn (which is
an integer since G is finitely generated) or the measure of Bn if a distribution
has been placed on the elements of G. Let S be the set of elements in G satisfying
 . The asymptotic density of S is then

lim

S  Bn

n→∞

Bn

provided this limit exists. We say that the property  is generic if the
asymptotic density of the set S of elements satisfying  is one.
This concept can be easily extended to properties of finitely generated
subgroups, We consider the asymptotic density of finite sets of elements that
generate subgroups that have a considered property. For example to say that a
group has the generic free group property we mean that
lim

Sm  Bm,n

m ,n→∞

Bm,n

=1

where S m is the collection of finite sets of elements of size m that generate a
free subgroup and Bm,n is the collection of m-element subsets within the n-ball.
We refer to the papers [12] and [13] for terminology and further definitions.
We say that a group G has the generic free group property if a finitely
generated subgroup is generically a free group. For example a result of Epstein

[14] says that the group GL ( n, R ) satisfies the generic free group property. A
group G has the strong generic free group property if given randomly chosen
elements g1 , , g n in G then generically they are a free basis for the free
subgroup they generate. Jitsukawa [5] proved that free groups have the strong
generic free group property. That is given k random elements W1 , , Wk in the
free group on y1 , , yn then with asymptotic density one W1 , , Wk are a free
basis for the subgroup they generate. We compare this with the Nielsen-Shreier
theorem that says that W1 , , Wk generate a free group. In the context of the
group randomizer protocols the strong generic free group property implies that

if V1 ( y1 , , ym ) , , Vk ( y1 , , ym ) have already been presented as challenge

words then the density is zero that a new challenge word V ( y1 , , ym ) lies in
the subgroup generated by V1 , , Vk and hence a homomorphism attack is
nullified.
The strong generic free group property has been extended to arbitrary free
products of infinite groups and many other amalgams including surface
groupsaid groups and br by Fine. Myasnikov and Rosenberger [13] and
Carstensen, Fine and Rosenberger [15].
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6. Security Analysis of the Group Randomizer Protocols
For the security analysis of the group randomizer password protocols, we make
the security assumption that an adversary has access to the coded group
theoretic responses. The strength of the proposed protocol is that an attacker
must steal three things; the original password, the group randomizer and the
challenge group. There is no access without all three. This immediately nullifies
middelman attacks. If the adversary pretends to be the verifier to obtain the
group words the attack is thwarted by the facts that the prover can verify the
verifier and further if the attacker just transmits from the middle, nothing can be
stolen since each time through a new challenge word must be used. Further the
group randomizer has an infinite supply of both subgroups and challenge
responses that are done randomly. In addition since a challenge word can be
used only once the protocol nullifies replay attacks. Since challenge responses
are machine to machine there is an essential probability of zero of an incorrect
response. The protocol shuts down with an incorrect response and hence repeat
attacks are harmless.
These are in distinction to answer-driven challenge-response systems where a
prover often forgets or misspells a response. In these systems a prover is usually
permitted several opportunities to answer. This makes these systems susceptible
to both middleman and repeat attacks.
There are two theoretical attacks that must be dealt with. Relative to these
attacks, the security of the system, and hence a security proof for the protocol, is
provided by several results in asymptotic group theory.
The most straightforward attack is for the adversary to collect enough
challenge words and responses. This provides a system of equations in a free
group (or a finitely presented group)

=
yi W=
1, , m.
i ( x1 , , xn ) , i
An adversary can then break the protocol by solving the system

yi = Wi ( x1 , , xm )
to obtain the challenge group.
A result of Lysenok [4] shows that solving such systems of equations in free
groups (and in most finitely presented groups) is NP-hard. Hence this method
of attack is impractical in most cases.
A second method of attack is based on the following. The mapping yi → Wi
is a homomorphism. If a challenge word appears in the subgroup generated by
previous challenge words then an attacker can use this to answer a challenge
without ever solving for the challenge group. However this approach fails due to
the strong generic free property. Each set of challenge words is a free basis for
the subgroup they generate with asymptotic density 1. Hence as explained in the
previous section the probability converges to zero that a new challenge word is
in the subgroup generated by previous challenge words.
DOI: 10.4236/jis.2018.92011
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There are several enhancements that can perhaps improve security:
1) Permutation Diffusion and Noise: Both the prover’s randomizer and the

verifier’s randomizer have a fixed coded set of permutations on {1, , k } where

k is the rank of the challenge group. Each presentation of a challenge word is
accompanied by a random one of these permutations. If φ is the presented

W ( y1 , , yk ) is evaluated on
W yφ (1) , , yφ ( k ) . As mentioned earlier this prevents hinders attacks by an
eavesdropper since discovering for example what W37 is, is of no use since it
will be indexed differently for the next use. The set of coded permutations is
agreed upon at initialization and becomes part of the common shared secret.
2) Short Challenge Words: In each challenge word W ( y1 , , yk ) , we assume
that not all k variables are used. In actual implementation we specify that the
number of variables t that appear in any challenge word is small relative to k the
rank of the challenge group. For example, we may have 5 ≤ t ≤ 8 with k = 256 .
Hence each equation that can be stolen by an attacker has only a relatively small
number of variables. This increases the number of equations necessary to impact
on a homomorphism solution which in turn is NP-hard to solve.
3) Frequent Reset: We recommend that the challenge group be reset relatively
often. Since this protocol is symmetric the rest must be done via some sort of
direct communication as in the original initialization of the secret key.

permutation then the challenge word

(

)

7. Actual Implementation of a Group Randomizer
System Protocol
The actual implementation of a workable group randomizer system protocol
involves several choices of parameters and subprograms. These include
1) The choice of the rank of the ambient free group in the free group method.
2) An enhancement program which takes a random choice of words

W1 , , Wk in a free group F and finds a new set of words V1 , , Vk generating
the same subgroup for which the words formed in V1 , , Vk have a great deal of
free cancellation. This involves what is called Nielsen transformations (see [7] [8]
[9]).
3) The choice of parameter sizes for the lengths of the randomly chosen words.
In an actual implementation all words in the generators will have lengths
between a and b where a and b are to be determined. All words used as test
logins will have lengths between c and d with c and d to be determined, The
optimal values for these parameters must be determined.

4) The implementation of a coded permutation system on {1, , k } where k

is the rank of the challenge group and so that a coded permutation can be sent
with each challenge word.
5) The development of an automatic reset protocol for the challenge group. In
an ideal situation this can be done without actually communicating the changes
between verifier and prover—that is each randomizer system does the same
protocol automatically when reset is called for.
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8. Alternative Methods Using Rational Matrices
Free groups have faithful representations in terms of rational and integral
matrices (see [16] [17]), or integral 2 × 2 matrices there is an algorithm to go
back and forth between a free group and the corresponding matrices in its
representation. This is explained in [16]. This can be used in several ways in
conjunction with the group randomizer.
First the basic free group method can be enhanced with the matrix
representation in the following manner. We assume that the group randomizer
has been extended to include the algorithm to go back and forth between a free
group and SL ( 2, Z ) mentioned above. Then what can be sent from verifier to
use is an integral matirx rather than a free group word. This is then deciphered
by the algorithm into a word in the free group. The prover’s group randomizer
then proceeds as in the standard free group method rewriting thw word in terms
of the stored password subgroup. Finally, this is rewritten in terms of the matrix
representation and an integral matrix sent back to the verifier. This presents a
further time obstacle to an attacker.
There is a simpler variation of the whole system solely using matrices. Each
prover is assigned a set of m × m invertible rational matrices M 1 , M 2 , , M k .
These are linked to the prover’s standard password as before. Each matrix is
assigned a free group variable
=
x1 M
=
M k . As in the standard free
1 , , xk
group method when the prover presents a password the verifier sends a a free
group word W ( x1 , , xk ) . The prover’s group randomizer evaluates this word
on M 1 , , M k to obtain a rational matrix M = W ( M 1 , , M k ) . This matrix M
is then sent back to the verifier. The verifier checks to see if the evaluation of the

sent word is correct or not. As before to verify that the verifier is legitimate the
process is repeated from the prover’s randomizer to the verifier.

An attacker here sees a matrix polynomial equation W ( x1 , , xk ) = M . This

must be solved for matrices M 1 , , M k in order to obtain access. For n ≥ 3
there is no factoring algorithm or solution algorithm for such equations and
hence if k is large (or even moderately large) the equation is feasibly insolvable.
This again present a one-time keypad type of approach. As mentioned earlier, if

the matrices are over the reals R, the group GL ( n, R ) has the generic free
group property.

9. The Group Randomizer and Container Security
Another very common security problem is container safety or container security.
Here a container means a large shipping unit and the fear is that some
contraband material or dangerous people will be stored or shipped via a
container. Our contention is that the group randomizer can be used here as a
secure lock.
We make the assumption that the shipper is legitimate and that we are only
interested in the main lock—that is we don’t consider the situation where a
terrorist group saws through the center of the container. We only want to check
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that the main lock has not been tampered with.
We assume that the main lock has been outfitted with a group randomizer.
When it is sealed, the group randomizer is given a finitely presented group as in
the password case. Since the protocol is symmetric key, the group is be
transmitted via some secure key exchange to the receiver. The main lock is set so
that when it is opened or tampered with the group is lost. When the container
gets to its destination, its group is checked by a group randomizer at the far end.
This of course can be done electronically. Without stealing the group, as in the
password case, the lock cannot be tampered with.
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